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ABSTRACT 
The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to 
support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks.  This paper 
discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, such that 
nonproliferation, international safeguards, and U.S. national safeguards and security are part of that 
design process.  In the United States the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and 
integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation 
considerations into the facility design process.  An effective and efficient design process is one which 
clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the 
execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective 
manner.  Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, 
physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a 
nuclear energy system or facility,” 1 with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more 
robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect.  This Safeguards by Design process has 
been developed such that it: 
• Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while 
reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies,
• Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design,
• Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as 
“full and equal” partners in the design process, 
• Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, 
and start-up of nuclear facilities, and 
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• Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into the design of nuclear facilities. 
This paper describes the work that has been completed in the development of a Safeguards by Design 
process for a project, illustrated by flow diagrams based upon the project phases described in U.S. 
Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital 
Assets.  The institutionalization of the Safeguards by Design process directly supports the goals of the 
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 2 and also aligns with goals and objectives of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.  Other benefits from institutionalizing this Safeguards by Design process are 
discussed within this paper. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the development of a process for Safeguards by Design (SBD), the example of a U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) nuclear facility was selected for evaluation during the design, construction, and start-up 
phases. The basic approach developed is expected to be applicable to nuclear facilities regardless of the 
regulations or directives governing their design, construction, and start-up. The guiding document for 
the design, construction and start-up of a large nuclear facility by the DOE is Program and Project 
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, DOE Order 413.3A.  One of the primary goals of 
this order is: 
To provide the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, with the project management direction for the acquisition of capital assets with 
the goal of delivering projects on schedule, within budget, and fully capable of meeting mission 
performance, safeguards and security, safety and health standards. 3
The DOE Acquisition Management System establishes principles and gated project management 
processes to translate user needs and technological opportunities into reliable and sustainable facilities, 
systems, and assets that achieve a required mission capability.  The system is organized by project 
phases, which represent a logical maturing of broadly stated mission needs into well-defined 
requirements resulting in operationally effective, suitable, and affordable facilities, systems and 
products.  
Figure 1 illustrates a high level perspective of the typical implementation of the DOE Acquisition 
Management System for large, complex projects.  This system utilizes four major phases for guiding 
the development and execution of a project: 
• Initiation Phase: pre-conceptual planning activities focus on the Program’s strategic 
goals and objectives, 
• Definition Phase: alternative concepts, based on user requirements, risks, costs, and 
other constraints, are analyzed to develop a recommended alternative, 
• Execution Phase: initial design concepts and the preliminary design are developed into 
detailed and final designs and plans, and 
• Transition/Closeout Phase: construction, final testing, inspection, and documentation 
are completed, and the project is prepared for operation. 
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Figure 1. Typical Project Under the DOE Acquisition Management System 
The amount of time between the phases will vary.  Additional descriptions and information regarding 
these decisions can be found in DOE O 413.3A.  In March 2008, DOE issued DOE-STD-1189-2008, 4
DOE Standard for the Integration of Safety Into the Design Process.  The purpose of this new standard 
is to define a design process that ensures that safety is designed into the facility, in full integration with 
the remainder of the project.  This standard contains some excellent new requirements, and was 
therefore chosen as a possible model for approaching the task of integrating international safeguards, 
together with national safeguards and security, into the design process. 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE SAFEGUARDS BY DESIGN PROCESS
The main objective of the Institutionalizing Safeguards by Design project is to develop and 
institutionalize a formalized, clear, simple process to guide the project team in the integration of 
nonproliferation, safeguards, and security into the design, construction, readiness review, and start-up 
of nuclear facilities that: 
• Requires the early creation of the Safeguards By Design (SBD) team with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities, 
• Focuses on early identification of intrinsic design features that enhance safeguards, 
security, or proliferation barriers, or that facilitate the implementation of extrinsic 
safeguards, security, or nonproliferation measures,
• Requires the use of life-cycle cost analysis as a key criterion for capital expenditure 
decisions between intrinsic (early) and extrinsic (later) design alternatives, and 
• Utilizes “systems engineering” processes to develop the optimum integration of 
operation, safety, safeguardability, protectability and nonproliferation into the facility 
design. 
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Figure 2 provides a simplified illustration of the activities that are performed during the initiation 
phase of the project that culminates in the approval of mission need. 
Figure 2. Initiation Phase Activities 
The creation of the SBD team at the beginning of the project is a key fundamental step of the SBD 
process.  This step is where the project manager establishes the Safeguards by Design team to support 
the project team in ensuring the integration of safeguards, security, and proliferation barriers into the 
design process, and to manage the preparation of relevant deliverables required to support each critical 
decision.  The SBD Design Strategy is a tool to guide project design and SBD documentation 
development planning, and to provide approving authorities sufficient information upon which to base 
decisions.  It provides a single, integrated compilation of the SBD policies, philosophies, major 
requirements, and goals for the project.  This strategy will be revised and updated as the project 
matures.  The SBD Design Strategy is structured to evolve into the information source needed for 
revising the Site Safeguards and Security Plan and the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 
Plan.  For National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) projects, a Program Requirements 
Document (PRD), which defines the ultimate goals the project must satisfy, is also prepared.  The PRD 
is a document intermediate between the high level Mission Needs Statement and the more detailed 
Functional and Operational Requirements (F&OR).  The SBD team identifies the high level 
requirements that must be included with the programmatic requirements that the facility must meet.  
For a successful project, a complete and clear statement of Functional and Operational Requirements 
must be generated and analyzed for iterative discussion among and approval by project disciplines and 
stakeholders.  Completely analogous to other disciplines, including safety-in-design, the SBD team 
identifies those high level requirements that must be met in order to achieve the desired performance.  
Note that the F&OR document captures the necessary requirements and constraints, but normally does 
not prescribe in detail how those needs are to be met.  The Design Criteria are criteria used to examine 
how well the F&OR are being met by the current evolution of the process and facility design. 
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Figure 3 provides a simplified illustration of activities that are performed during the definition phase of 
the project that culminates in the approval of alternatives selection.  For clarity, the term ‘safeguards’ 
is used in this paper to encompass national safeguards, international safeguards, nonproliferation 
considerations, and physical security. 
Figure 3. Definition Phase Activities 
During the definition phase, the safeguards and security related conceptual design activities are 
performed and integrated with the conceptual design of the facility.  The relevant Design Criteria test 
the requirements for performing the conceptual design activities.  Integration of Safeguards by Design
must meet safeguards and security guiding principles, analogous to how integration of safety into the 
design process must meet the safety design guiding principles provided within DOE-STD-1189-2008.  
This entails identifying and evaluating alternative facility layout and processing configurations to best 
meet safeguards and security requirements.  Systems engineering is used in this phase, as well as the 
subsequent preliminary and final design phases of the project.  “Systems engineering is a process that 
progresses through the establishment of functions and requirements, performance of functional 
analyses, the identification and evaluation of alternatives, the selection of a preferred alternative, and 
validation of the preferred alternative.  The process ends with verification that the need is met, 
including interfaces, fit, and completeness.” 5  Nonproliferation, safeguards (to include international 
and national considerations), and security requirements and associated functions serve as input to the 
overall systems that satisfy the project requirements.  As the design progresses, changes and updates 
will be shared with the Safeguards by Design team.  The SBD team will then cycle through their 
design analysis.  Facility and system designs or updates to mitigate risks are developed.  The outcome 
is analyzed (Vulnerability Assessments, exercises, etc.) and assessed versus the requirements and 
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criteria.  The SBD team then optimizes the integration of the design, requirements, and criteria.  This 
loop is performed as necessary until the SBD team is satisfied with the outcome, and then the design 
cycle passes back to the overall project team.  Additional work will be required in the future to 
identify, and develop where necessary, the formal requirements, design criteria, and evaluation tools 
for incorporating proliferation barriers into the design. 
It is during this SBD design activity and the earlier examination of alternative facility layout and 
process configurations, where the greatest opportunities for identifying and incorporating intrinsic 
features for safeguardability, protectability and proliferation barriers into the facility design exist.  Life 
cycle cost analysis should be utilized to balance tradeoffs between early (intrinsic) capital costs and 
later (extrinsic) operating costs, which are incurred by both the operator and the regulatory agencies.  
The following reports are developed during this definition phase of the project and are updated as 
necessary as the project design is performed: 
• Vulnerability Assessment Report, 
• Cybersecurity Plan, 
• Safeguards Effectiveness Report, 
• Updated Safeguards Design Strategy, and 
• Conceptual Safeguards Validation Report 
The Safeguards Validation Reports are prepared by DOE at key decision points including completion 
of conceptual, preliminary, and final design activities.  They document the DOE reviews of the 
Safeguards Effectiveness Reports and are prerequisites for moving from the definition phase to and 
through the execution phase.  The DOE reviews the Safeguards Effectiveness Reports against the 
Safeguards Design Strategy and documents the reviews in the validation report to confirm that the 
Safeguards positions adopted during conceptual, preliminary, and final design will meet the defined 
requirements and success criteria, and constitute appropriately conservative bases to proceed. 
The primary activities performed in the definition phase, as highlighted in Figure 3, are repeated in the 
execution phase in order to proceed from the development of the preliminary design to the completion 
of the final design.  The SBD design team cycles through their design analysis as the design 
progresses.  Changes and updates are shared by the SBD team and the design is updated to ensure the 
requirements contained in the Safeguards Design Criteria are being met.  In addition to the Final 
Design Report, the Final Safeguards Validation report is developed to document that the final design 
meets the requirements of the Safeguards Design Criteria. 
Figure 4 highlights the high level activities and documentation created to complete the Construction, 
Transition, Start-up, and Closeout of the project. 
INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
In developing the SBD process, the potential for future application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards was reviewed.  Intrinsic features that are necessary to allow proper IAEA 
verification must be considered and included, as necessary, early in the design process to avoid costly 
redesign and retrofit efforts.  Early notification to the IAEA to initiate the international process is 
crucial.  Additionally, for Nuclear Weapons States, such as the United States, determination of whether 
to place the facility on the Eligible Facilities List must occur early to permit the rest of the processes to 
proceed in a timely fashion. 
7 
49th Annual Meeting: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Nashville, TN. July 13th-17th, 2008. 
Figure 4. Transition/Closeout Phase 
The IAEA involvement currently begins in earnest with the preparation and submittal of the Design 
Information Questionnaire (DIQ).  Preparation of the DIQ requires that a minimal amount of design 
has been completed; thus, this action is required immediately after the completion of the conceptual 
design phase.  Transmittal of the DIQ to the IAEA requires coordination among the design team, 
national regulatory agencies, (e.g. DOE) and state level organizations (e.g. U.S. State Department).  
The Facility Attachment is a negotiated document between the IAEA and the state regarding the 
features (intrinsic and extrinsic) that will be incorporated into the facility design to accommodate the 
IAEA verification activities during construction and operation.  It is vital that the impact of the facility 
attachment on the physical plant (lab space, conduits, footprint of hot cells, etc.) be agreed upon in a 
timely fashion to allow the detailed design efforts to proceed.  As the design effort progresses to the 
final details, so also does the input from the IAEA facility attachment.  As the facility design is 
optimized and reviewed for final approval, the IAEA input is finalized and incorporated into the 
overall design. 
As construction begins, Design Information Verification activities will be performed by the IAEA 
through all stages of construction and will continue as required during operation.  As the facility is 
built and prepared for operation, the equipment will be delivered and installed (including testing, 
tamper-proofing, initial calibrations, etc.). 
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CONCLUSION 
The reemergence of nuclear power and subsequent growth in all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle 
requires that safeguards be applied in a most effective and efficient manner.  Therefore, it can readily 
be seen that a significant need exists to develop an institutional approach for incorporating Safeguards 
by Design into the design of nuclear facilities.  The development of an SBD process that requires the 
establishment of the SBD team by the project manager is a key ingredient of the institutional approach 
discussed in this paper.  This early, integrated design focus can produce more robust facilities and 
systems, while reducing the life-cycle operating costs to both the operator and the regulatory agencies.  
Doing so is therefore warranted and should be enthusiastically embraced by project teams.  
Additionally, the SBD process adds consideration of proliferation barriers into the design process, 
including the application of international safeguards.  
Many of the individual elements of the SBD process are already formalized and have been utilized in 
past and current projects.  However, this paper proposes a process for their tight integration into a 
single comprehensive framework, with the addition of some new elements and activities to meet new 
needs.  The new process has a major objective to fully exploit the efficacy and cost savings potential of 
the early introduction of beneficial intrinsic design features.  The greatest potential to capitalize on 
intrinsic features occurs early in the design process, during the conceptual design phase.  This is when 
the objectives are to identify design candidates and their risk and cost ranges, recommend a preferred 
design approach, and establish the general facility layout.  This places the greatest burden for 
successful execution in the earliest stages of the project.  For success, the SBD project team must be 
involved from day one of the project. 
The SBD process discussed in this paper directly supports goals of the Next Generation Safeguards 
Initiative, as well as goals and objectives of the IAEA.  This process supports the development of a 
“Safeguards Design Basis” similar to the “Safety Design Basis” utilized at nuclear facilities in the 
United States.  The primary objective is the design of nuclear facilities with high safeguardability.  
Potential obstacles to successful SBD are recognized; however, as we proceed to formalize and 
institutionalize the SBD process, we will remove or mitigate the obstacles.  All relevant parties should 
work together to develop a process that ensures the early involvement of the SBD team in the design of 
facilities in order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness throughout the lifecycle of the facility.
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